in Her eSSaY "WHat FeminiSm meanS to me," tHe Second-Wave FeminiSt vivian GornicK deScribeS Her entrY into 1970S FeminiSm in terms that have become very familiar. First, there is the "exhilaration" that comes from feminist analysis, "the particular type of joy [that arises] when a sufficiently large number of people are galvanized by a social explanation of how their lives have taken shape and are gathered together . . . elaborating the insight and repeating the analysis" (64-65). Then there is the seemingly inevitable declension. " [A] round 1980," Gornick reports, "feminist solidarity began to unravel. As the world had failed to change sufficiently to reflect our efforts, that which had separated all women before began to reassert itself now in us. . . . Personalities began to jar, conversations to bore, ideas to repeat themselves" (66-67). While Gornick's account may at this point seem routine, her perspective on the routine makes her description remarkable: in contrast to countless other such reports, Gornick places no blame on the internal politics of feminism itself, either in the form of the critique by radical women of color or in the turn to theory. And, in the absence of this blame laying, something else becomes visible: in Gornick's reckoning, the problem was not so much that feminist analysis was challenged and hence destabilized by internal critique but rather that it remained the same for too long, so that it stopped being exciting and came to feel boring and repetitive instead. In suggesting that repetition in and of itself may be a problem for feminism, Gornick's account gestures toward some of the complex and, I think, usually unexplored relations that feminist theory implies between the new, the politically useful, and the intellectually compelling.
These relations seem to be of increasing import in some of the current transformations taking place in some areas of feminist theory. It is clear from a number of indicators that the foundationalism debates of the early and mid-1990s, immortalized in the collections Feminism/ Postmodernism (Nicholson) and FeministContentions (Benhabib et al.) , have ended, and certainly the perception that "[p]ersonalities began to jar, conversations to bore, [and] ideas to repeat themselves" plays some role in the apparently widespread relief at laying those debates to rest. In an essay on the fate of women's studies departments entitled "Success and Its Failures," for example, Biddy Martin points out that, while she has supported the various shifts associated with the antifoundationalist position, "for some time I have also been teaching, speaking, and writing about the excesses of 'social constructionism' and the repetitive and predictable analyses of gender that constructionist languages have inspired" (356). What's intriguing about Martin's analysis is the way in which the failures and excesses of what she calls social constructionism become intertwined with its overfamiliarity, its tendency to be "repetitive and predictable." Martin avoids rehearsing the internal debates about constructionism in part because she suggests that social-constructionist insights have become "routine, and, thus, impoverished practices"-and the equation of the routine with the impoverished has an apparently selfevident logic (371). It seems as if the aging of the social-construction analysis has made debating its content unnecessary, as if the sheer passage of time has somehow done for us what we could not do for ourselves: moved us beyond a radically skeptical position that for years successfully cast any alternatives to its insights as naive and politically retrograde.1
This temporal displacement seems to have opened up new avenues for some varieties of feminist thought, particularly with regard to long-standing critiques of science. For example, Martin begins her essay by describing the now routine nature of most feminist analysis, but she quickly moves to a particular aspect of this routine: the de facto exclusion of science and especially biology as anything other than objects of critique and dismissal. While Martin recounts that she became interested in science by collaborating with a child psychologist and sharing administrative duties with a neurobiologist, it is clear that merely encountering scientists would not be sufficient to dislodge what she calls "the resistance among many feminist scholars to the notion that 'biology' might play any role at all in the construction of subjectivity"; as any feminist pedagogue knows firsthand, the existence of counterevidence is not usually sufficient to alter a person's belief system (358). In a sense, the co-incidence of the predictability of feminist analysis and the excitement offered by science seems to provide its own implicit causality: we can now give science a chance because we're tired of hearing that we shouldn't, and science has until now been so far outside our purview that it is refreshing rather than routine.2 While the turn to science may seem more like an abandonment of than a solution to the issues raised by poststructuralism, there may not ultimately be much of a difference between those two concepts. As Michèle Barrett put it, it is debatable whether any given problem can be rethought within the terms of reference of one's existing theory, or whether-in order to proceed-one has to develop a new framework altogether. Ernesto Laclau has written about this in terms of whether one can ever, strictly speaking, "solve" a theoretical problem within the original paradigm. Laclau suggests that one can't: that if a problem is a genuinely "theoretical" problem (rather than a matter of how you apply a theory, or the empirical support for it) it cannot be solved but can only be "superseded" in a new theory.
That Barrett was writing over ten years ago about what has come to be called the cultural turn only seems to make her point more telling: if social construction was required to supersede the problems of materialism, the turn to science could supersede the problems of social constructionism. The content of some new work on science seems to bear out this supposition.3 Elizabeth Grosz offers a fascinating meditation on Dar-win in relation to Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson in her recent TheNickofTime, and she has connected these observations to feminism explicitly in the companion volume TimeTravels, suggesting that we must rethink what has become a knee-jerk rejection of the supposedly inert and static natural world in favor of the seemingly volatile and changeable realm of culture.4 Opening up similar avenues from within the field of neurology, Elizabeth
Wilson has posed what in the wake of social constructionism can only be read as radical questions about the importance of considering physiology and biology for feminists. As Wilson puts it in Psychosomatic:Feminism andtheNeurologicalBody, she hopes that "sustained interest in biological detail will have a reorganizing effect on feminist theories of the body-that exploring the entanglement of biochemistry, affectivity and the physiology of the internal organs will provide us with new avenues into the body" (14). Wilson's account is particularly successful when she suggests that the different ways of mapping complexity associated with neurology might offer us a model for thinking sameness and difference, rule and exception, simultaneously. In such passages, it does seem possible that certain ways of thinking arising from biology, as a new paradigm, may enable us to supersede if not solve some of the epistemological dilemmas we have faced since the early 1990s.5
And such new developments aren't limited to the turn to science. In the calm after the storm of the social-construction debates, other areas of investigation and modes of inquiry have begun to emerge. In her essay "Toward a New Feminist Theory of Rape," for example, Carine Mardorossian has raised compelling questions about the apparent inability of contemporary theory to address situations in which women are victims of sexual violence. As Mardorossian points out, such situations have become the purview of either sociological analysis or mass media backlash discourse, while feminist theory has zeroed in on the problems that arise when women claim victim status.6 What is especially striking about Mardorossian's approach is her insistence that the brute reality of women's continued sexual victimization is not the opposite of theory but rather an incredibly pressing ground for theory. What's at issue for her is not the old theory/ praxis divide but a theory/ object divide: the way that feminist theory cannot address certain objects without ceasing to be recognizable as theory-without automatically shifting the object to another realm of discourse. While differing substantially in focus, Linda Zerilli's recent FeminismandtheAbyssofFreedom likewise offers evidence that new perspectives on the last ten years of feminist debate are becoming possible. Rereading the foundationalism debates from within the realm of political theory, Zerilli argues that late-1980s and 1990s feminism became entangled in an epistemological problem regarding rules and their applications that has a long history in philosophy. She turns to two philosophers who she argues offer the most potent tools for extricating thought from this predicament: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hannah Arendt. Although the solutions Zerilli develops through her engagement with these thinkers are ingenious, perhaps even more significant is the way in which she locates the foundationalism debates in a larger intellectual history that goes some measure toward explaining their inevitability. As Zerilli convincingly demonstrates, feminism's epistemological conundrums were unavoidable for a political project that emerged in the twentieth century; the Pandora's box of radical skepticism was already open, and it conditioned the political world in which feminism emerged and took shape.
While the audibility of these different perspectives may owe much to an openness created by the temporal displacement of the foundationalism debates, feminism's implication in what might be called the temporalization of knowledge also has a more problematic aspect, which I have deliberately left to one side until now. As the repeated declarations of feminism's death in the mainstream media and the academy make clear, the production of the new as a signal intellectual value can be used to dismiss uncomfortable insights, which don't have to be disproved as long as they can be made to seem passé. Feminism can be implicated in this same logic itself. For example, the growing tendency to place the debates of the 1980s and 1990s in the past might be seen to offer feminism an all-tooconvenient opportunity to shelve the critiques by radical women of color that are also associated with those decades. Conversations about such internal temporal divides have primarily been confined to the use and critique of generational rhetoric and the debates over and between different waves of feminist activism.7 Often underlying such debates was the question of which version of feminism was more appropriately situated in time: third-wave feminists often accused secondwave feminist analysis of being out of date, and second-wave feminists accused thirdwave feminists of anachronistically reinventing the wheel.8 This insistence on fidelity to one's moment inheres in even the most thoroughgoing critiques of progress narratives in feminist theory. One of the most successful arguments against traditional Marxist theory offered during the postmodern turn was that the defeats suffered by the left were, as Wendy Brown put it, "consequent to the Left's own failure to apprehend the character of the age and to develop a political and moral critique and a moral-political vision appropriate to this character" ("Resisting" 458).9 In other words, our theory and our politics had to change because our world had changed, and unmodified Marxism no longer explained the moment and thus no longer served as an adequate political theory for it. Even Brown's more recent promotion of critical theory as a practice of the untimely doesn't seem to escape this logic completely: Brown cautions against letting fear deter us from critique because "in our times" fear is the watchword of "terror and empire" (Edgework 10). To be untimely is to resist fear precisely because fear is constructed in a certain way inourtimes. For Brown, being untimely requires resisting the pressure to merely replicate the terms of the times, but it also means producing a critique that speaks aslant to the contemporary moment, that makes us see and approach the current moment differently.10
Obviously, we can hardly do otherwise if feminist theory wants to speak to the state of the world and of the people who inhabit it. Yet, precisely because feminism does want to speak to and hence change the world, feminist theory has a profound investment in timeliness, which inevitably embroils it in the relation among novelty, interest, and merit that characterizes modernity. While the notion that the new is always improved is a cliché of modernity, the interesting is also a temporalized category unique to the modern dynamic. As Patricia Meyer Spacks points out, before the nineteenth century interesting meant both "affecting" and "important"; it evoked both the subjective experience of being moved by or concerned in an event and the objective standard of significance constructed by a larger community. "By the beginning of the nineteenth century, interesting had split one meaning from the other," and it came to refer primarily to "unregulated personal response" (128). In the newer meaning, that which is interesting exists to save us from the empty time of modernity, to rescue us from the cessation of desire we identify as boredom, which itself is created by modernity.11 For feminism, however, the other, older meaning of interest is preserved alongside the newer meaning: as a community, we have decided that theories that can change the world for women are important, and we are interested in those theories. But, because of the continual transformations of capital and culture, we are still hostages to the later meaning of interest, with its links to the currency of Feminist theory [ P M L A the novel and the compelling. Simply put, if the world changes, our theory must change because it no longer speaks to the current state of the world. Then again, if the world doesn't change, our theory must still change because it is supposed to change the world, and if it doesn't, it must not have been the right tool for the job. For feminist theory, the timely and the important are even more deeply implicated than they are in modernity at large, and thus we tend to assume that theory that is no longer novel is no longer useful-that what is uninteresting is also unimportant.
As Gornick's anecdote makes clear, this structure becomes a particular problem when it is feminism itself that bores us. In a way that only its devaluing has made fully clear, the temporal currency of feminism has consistently been its raison d'être, its legal tender in the world of academic exchange.12 What, besides potential career anxiety, might it mean to produce feminist theory outside its "appropriate" moment, to risk the genuinely untimely? One way of answering this question might be to attend to some of the work being done on boredom. In ExperiencewithoutQualities, Elizabeth Goodstein suggests that the aporia that seems to surround boredom, its resistance to analysis, is a measure of the successful way that modernity obscures its own workings, so that we name its effects but forget and seem unable to interrogate their origins. Tracing the way that the language of boredom splits into material and ideal accounts that reflect our contemporary disciplinary boundaries, Goodstein suggests that boredom marks the way that the modern creates problems of meaning and problems of matter as separate and incommensurate realms. Thus, as a problem of meaning created by material transformations, boredom encodes a gesture toward a synthesis that we cannot enact in modern intellectual endeavor. In our continued inability to think through boredom, Goodstein suggests, we only repeat that failure. By placing both the philosophical-idealist and sociological-materialist accounts onto a single historical continuum and mapping their shared and divergent failures of analysis, Goodstein pushes toward a reintegration of methodologies of matter and meaning that is surprisingly reminiscent of the syntheses of scientific and philosophical discourse beginning to appear in work like Grosz's and Wilson's. If boredom attests to a split in scientific and humanistic endeavor that characterizes modernity, then it may be that the denaturalization of boredom and the push past disciplinary boundaries in feminism are occurring together for a reason. Especially if that is the case, Goodstein's analysis suggests the importance of refusing to let boredom and interest remain self-explanatory values, of resisting their self-presentation as antitheoretical objects of unquestionable experience.
In part, this may mean giving a bit more thought to the implicit links we construct between the customary, the dull, and the conservative. If we agree that we must intercede in the current direction of the world, we do have to interrupt the contemporary moment with a practice of the untimely. As much recent work has suggested, such interruptions need not appear historically new.13 Yet when we assume that familiar approaches can no longer serve as tools to dislodge the present, we demonstrate a continued affinity for the modern logic that equates the new, the interesting, and the valuable.14 In so doing, we sidestep the difficult realization that while intellectual work should be exciting, political work may be dull, that things may stay true longer than they stay interesting. Perhaps more significantly, we miss the opportunity to see what our boredom might have to tell us. When we are bored with something, it is because it seems to have been with us too long; when we are simply bored, we lack an object that engages us and makes the blank homogeneity of modern time feel less burdensome and empty.15 Boredom is both a by-product of the temporal logic of modernity and a hiccup in that logic, a kind of affective marker of the untimely in modernity itself. 16 In the light of this temporal logic, we may want to rethink how seemingly inevitable it has been for feminist theory to leave behind that which bores us.
Notes
1. This is not to say that any particular feminist theorist propounded this position (though it has been frequently attributed to Judith Butler). Rather, the radically skeptical position became a kind of umbrella under which various epistemological critiques were subsumed. For an analysis of the problematic yet predictable reception of Butler's GenderTrouble in particular, see Zerilli 47-62.
2. For an analysis of the disciplinary trajectory of feminist studies in terms of cyclical field differentiation, merging and division, see 3. Donna Haraway's early-1990s investigations of science from a feminist position in Simians,Cyborgs,and Women both prefigured and contributed to this contemporary turn. See also Haraway's more recent Modest_ Witness@ Second_ Millennium. On biology and gender in particular, see Fausto-Sterling. 4. See in particular Grosz's "The Nature of Culture" (TimeTravels 43-54).
5. Wilson's discussion of reticulation is especially fruitful (49-59).
6. See Brown, States52-76. Mardorossian responds to Brown's argument in detail (757-68).
7. On the topic of feminist generations, see especially Looser and Kaplan; Whittier; Henry. 8. The literature on the third wave has become substantial. For writings from within the third wave, see Baumgardner and Richards; Hey wood and Drake; Walker. For analyses of the phenomenon and the debates surrounding it, see Gillis, Howie, and Munford. More recent parlance has begun to refer to the 1980s and 1990s critique by women of color and 1990s social constructionism as themselves constituting the third wave; it may be that this new use of the terminology indicates an increasing perception that these debates are past and thus may now be named and codified. For examples of this usage, see Zerilli; Mann and Huffman. 9. Brown in this passage is summarizing a view offered by Stuart Hall. For another classic argument about postmodern politics as necessarily speaking to the contemporary state of the world, see .
10. For a very different approach to the untimely, see Grosz, Nick. 
